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In the Suprem.e Court of the
State of Utah

JOSEPH M. TRACY, State Engineer,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.

L.M.PETERSON;MrnS.R.M.

CASE
NO. 7966

OLDROYD; and MILBURN IRRIGATION COMPANY, a corporation,
'Defendants and Respondents

RESPONDENTS' BRIE:F
Appellant's "Statement of Facts'' is fragmentary and
it evidences an apparent misunderstanding concerning the
basic facts shown by the record. It is, therefore, deemed
necessary for the respondents to make a more complete
statement.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
·This action was commenced by Joseph M. Tracy, State
Engineer, against the various defendants, the material allegations of the complaint being as follows:
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1. Stating the appointment and qualifications of Joseph M. Tracy as· State Engineer.
2. Stating the organization and existence of the Milburn Irrigation Company, and the residence of the defend-

ants.
3. That pursuant to statute, the plaintiff appointed
a water commissioner of Sanpitch River.
4. That each of the defendants is the owner of rights
to the use of, entitled to use, and does use, waters of the
Sanpitch River.
5. That the salary of the said water commissioner
was determined and fixed at a meeting duly and regularly
called by the State Engineer of the water users of said river.
6. That the State Engineer levied assessments during
the years 1950 and 1951 against the water users of Sanpitch River fur their proportionate share of the moneys
necessary to pay the expenses of said water commissioner.
That as to the defendants, RayS. Tanner, Tim Fowels, Winston Mower, George Olsen, Urban Hartley, John W. Irons,
R. A. Olsen and Wanless Rassmusen, said assessments were
based upon the amount of diversions. made by e ach defendant during the previous year. That as to the defendant,
Olsen and Ephraim Company, a water association, said assessment was based on a flat $10 per year. That all of the
other defendants were newly listed water users during the
year 1951. Assessments against said water users were determined by an estimate made by the water users associa·
tion as to the amount of water used by said defendants.
(To avoid confusion, it should be noted here that there was
no evidence as to any water users association estimate and
the estimates of any association are not involved.)
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7. That defendants, and each of .them, have failed,
neglected and refused to pay the water assessment levied
against him by the State Engineer in the year and in the
amount set out as follows: (Thirty-four defendants are
then listed and the amounts assessed against each for the
years 1951 and 1950 are stated. Only five users are listed
for 1950, but all defendants are listed for 1951. Of the five
for 1950, three are the respondents herein (File 1-3).
8. That if the assessments are not paid, the State Engineer will not have, and at the present time does not have,
sufficient moneys to pay the salary of the river commissioner.

The defendants and respondents, L. L. Peterson, Mrs.
R. M. Oldroyd and Milburn Irrigation Company, filed separate answers, which were substantially as follows:
1. The plaintiff's ·complaint as to the defendant fails
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

2. Defendant admits paragraphs 1, 2 and 7 of the complaint; as to paragraphs 3 and 5 thereof, defendant alleges
that he is without knowledge or information sufficient to
form a ·belief as to the truth of the allegations therein contained.
3. As to paragraph 6 of the complaint, defendant admits that he received notice of purported assessments for
the years 1950 and 1951 for the distribution of .water to
him from Sanpitch River, but in this connection denies that
during said years, or either of them, he had distributed to
him or used any water from Sanpitch River, and defendant
further denies that the State Engineer by reason of any
estimate of the water users association, or upon any other
pretended basis, was authorized to make any assessment
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against the defendant, and that any such pretended assessments are void.
4. This defendant further alleges that the said pretended assessments have no reasonable basis or justification either by reason of services rendered or on account of
any water distributed to him from Sanpitch River, for the
payment of any proportionate share of aey monies necessary to pay the water commissioners or commissioners for
Sanpitch River.
5. The defendant denies each and every allegation of
the complaint not hereinbefore admitted or otherwise denied (File 36-41).
. qpon the foregoing issues the case was tried, argued
and decided in open court in fiavor of plaintiff and against
the defendants. The court directed the attorney for plaintiff
to draw findings of fact, conclusions of law and decree (Tr.
115). Following the annormcement of the court's decision
as above stated, the attorney for plaintiff applied to the
court to be permitted to amend the complaint by interlineation by adding "system" after "Sanpitch River" whenever
the latter appeared in the complaint. Thus, paragraph 3
of the complaint was made to read that pursuant to statute
plaintiff appointed a water commissioner for "Sanpitch
River System''; also in paragraph 4, 5 and 6 a similar change
was made by adding "system" whenever "Sanpitch River"
was mentioned in the original complaint, thereby changing
the issues framed by the pleadings and thus making the
evidence adduced upon the trial almost wholly inapplicable
to the new issue attempted to be made. However, the court
over the objection of defendants to the effect that the proposed amendment would change the cause of action upon
which the case was tried, overruled the objection and per-
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mitted the amendments to be made on the ground that they
would conform to the evidence (Tr. 115-116).
Appellant in his brief disposes of more than 100 pages
of evidence reported in the transcript in five short paragraphs. Since this is an action at law, the findings of the
lower court must stand unless the evidence favorable to
defendants taken as true with all reasonable intendments
does not support the judgment. Respondent has not pointed
out wherein the court has thus failed, but so that it may
not be assumed from general statements that it has, we
take this means of giving a fuller statement of the facts of
the record which, we think, by a great preponderance support the conclusions and judgment.
Frank Reese, ~chief accountant of the State Engineer's
office, testified that he computed the assessments claimed
against the defendants from a report furnished by the
water users of the Sanpitch River, taking the overall gross
total of acre feet delivered to the water users, arriving at
a calculating factor ·and computing what the individual assessments would be for the three defendants (Tr. 1-3);
against Mr. Peterson, 1951-$57.55; 1950-$71.62; total$123.17; Mrs. Oldroyd, 1951-$26.90; 1950-$37.13; total-·
$64.03; Milburn Irrigation Co., 1951-$66.18; 1950- $77.15;
total- $143.33 (Tr. 4-5). HJe knew nothing about how
much water was delivered, assumed that the reports of
quantities made to him were correct and assumed that the
waters were part of the waters of Sanpitch River (Tr. 6).
In connection with his testimony it was stipulated that the
waters of Lone Pine Creek, Dry Creek and all of the other
creeks that come down out of the mountains in Sanpete
County were not taken into consideration in determining
the assessments (Tr. 7-8).
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Blain Draper, witness for the plaintiff, testified that
he was employed by the State Engineer as commissioner of
the Sanpitch River and that he prepared the river commissioner's report. The defendants, Peterson, Oldroyd and Milburn Irrigation Company, had no measuring devices and the
water diverted by them was estimated. He went ·up and
viewed the diversions from time to time as he thought he
needed to and estimated them (Tr. 11-13). He couldn't
remember when he went up hut started about the first of
May, and included high water as ·well as low water and
charged them for it (Tr. 14-15), and was not interested in
whether they put the water on their land or not {Tr. 16).
He claimed that the Sanpitch River commences with the
North Fork and that this was the head of Sanpitch River;
he said that the South Fork was also the head, too (Tr. 1719).
The decree in the case of Richlands Irrigation Co. v.
West View Irrigation Company, et al, Qvil Case No. 843
of the Fifth Judicial District, ~being the so-called ''COx Decree" of the general adjudication of the waters of the Sevier
River System, was received in evidence, with particular reference to the part beginning on page 70, dealing with San·
pitch River (Tr. 29). Chapter V of this decree, beginning
on page 70, divided the Sanpitch River System into two
types of awards, i. e: Sanpitch River and tributaries. For
example, typical headings of the awards, with the pages on
which they appear, and omitting the details as to the

awards, are:
"Chapter V.
"To this includes all of the rights to the use of the waters of Sanpitch River and its tributaries and certain
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other miscellaneous rights to the use of water in Sanpete County, Utah.
"That as to the rights to the use of waters of Sanpitch
River and its tributaries, and as to the right to the use
of the water of certain miscellaneous sources of supply
in Sanpete County, Utah,

'' IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJU!DGED AND DECREED:
uThat the parties to this action as hereinafter set out
in this chapter are the OWners of the right to the use
of the waters of the Sanpitch River and its tributaries
and from the other miscellaneous sources of supply in
Sanpete County, within the Sevier River System, and
they are entitled to have said waters as hereinafter set
out, distributed to them for the purposes and in the
quantities and for the periods of time as follows:
Sanpitch River and Tributaries
North Fork (p. 70)
South Fork (p. 71)
Lone Pine Creek (p. 72)
Springs (p. 72)
Stewart Spring (p. 73)
Sanpitch River {p. 73)
Crooked Creek & Stewart Springs (p. 73)
Dry Creek (p. 74)
Sanpitch River {p. 75) .
Indi-an Spring Hollow (p. 75)
Sanpitch River {PI 76)
Oak Creek {p 76)
Spring Branch (p. 77)
Spring Area (p. 77)
6 Springs {p. 78)
Spring Area (p. ·78)
Cottonwod Creek (p. 78)
Seepage Springs (p. 79)
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Oid Mill Race (p. 80)
Spring Creek (p. 80)
Cottonwood Wash (p. 80)
Sanpitch River (p. 81)
Spring Creek Sloughs (p. 81)
Lower Spring Creek (p. 83)
Spring Creek Canyon (p. 83)
Archie's Hallow (p. 84)
Birch Creek (p. 84)
Spring Area (p. 86)
Sanpitch River (p. 88)
North Creek (p. 88)
Springs (p. 91)
Pleasant Creek (p. 92)
Springs (p. 95)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... .
Sanpitch River and Tributaries (p. 104-111)
Peterson Slough (p. 114)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....
Sanpitch River (p. 118)
Gamit Canyon (p. 119)
Sanpitch River (p. 129)
Cottonwood and New Canyons-Tributary
to Sanpitch River (p. 140)
Ephraim Willow ,Creek (p. 141)

Manti City Creek (p. 147),
(and so forth, on down the river).
It will thus be seen that the rights on the North and
South Forks, under which defendants' water rights in question come, are classified in the same manner as all other
tributaries or other sources as distinguished from "Sanpitch
River", and when rights are awarded under Sanpitch River
they are done so under that term, as distinguished from
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tributaries and other sources such as South Fork, North
Fork, Manti City Creek, etc.
Attention is called to the stipulation referred to above
in this connection, wherein it is stipulated that no other
creeks. all of \Vhich are tributary to Sanpitch River, were
included in the water users' meeting, or assessments We
also invite attention to page 184 of the Cox Decree reading
as follows, \vhich again shows the difference between the
treatment of tributaries or other sources as distinguished
from Sanpitch River proper:
"In the interpretation of the provisions of this decree
under Chapter Five, the following rules must prevail
unless it is specifically provided herein to the contrary:

That priorities, as to the use of waters, shall apply
to each particular tributary with respect to which the
priority of use is given, and the same shall not be applied to the priorities upon Sanpitch River unless a different meaning is apparent from the specific language
of any award."
"1.

The Cox Decree, plaintiff's Exhibit 2, was admitted in
evidence, (Tr. 23-24), especially referring to page 70, chapter V, of said decree.
Referring to the. North Fork, a tributary of Sanpitch
River, as shown on pages 71 to 72, the following awards· are
made: to the water users on the North Fork of Sanpitch
River, water rights are awarded to the amount of 15.80 cubic feet per second (pp. 70-71) and on the South Thrk there
is awarded water rights to the water users on the said tributary 10.45 cubic feet per second (pp. 72-108).
That according to the commissioner's report for 1950,
the water users of the said North Fork at no time diverted
or used as much water as decreed to them, except one estiSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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mated amount, as shown by said decree according to the
report of the water commissioner for the year 1950, defendant's Exhibit "E", and. the water users of the South Fork
even according to the estimates of said water commissioner
at no time diverted from said South Fork any water in excess of the amount decreed, e~ept at three estimates made
by said commissioner between the 21st and 26th of May,
incl., 1950.
That notwithstanding these facts according to the said
commissioner's report, plaintiff's Exhibit "E", he made over
fifty trips up to these two forks and the diversions on them
during the summer of 1950, a distance from Fairview of 8
to 10 miles. No report of the water commissioner was introduced in evidence in support of the 1951 assessments.
L. L. Peterson for the defendants testified that the Sanpitch River commences just south of the divide between
Thistle Valley and Sanpete Valley. There is a channel there
with a spring in it, which carries in the neighborhood of
one-half second foot of water which runs all the year round.
There is a well-defined channel for about one-fifth of a mile
north from where North Sanpitch Creek comes directly
from the east and flows west until it connects with this
stream and then both of them run south. The river runs
north and south and North Sanpitch Creek runs into it from
the east. There was an old dam that has broken out and
water has run through it for years (Tr. 27-29). South Sanpitch Creek (South Fork) is about two miles south from
North Sanpitch Creek. The Oldroyd home is two or three
hundred feet north from where this creek crosses the road
Then going farther south two or three miles is Lone Pine
(Tr 30) . Sanpitch River is in the lowest part of the valley
(Tr. 31). North Sanpitch Creek goes down fast, and from
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the first part of June the \vater is approxintately gone, about
dry, and that is about right as concerns South Creek (Tr.
33). The witness had never heard until coming into court
that the North Fork \vas considered as the Sanpitch River.
Prior to Mr. Draper coming up the last two or three years,
no one has come up to measure the water to his knowledge
(Tr. 33-44). In the summer all the water of North Fork
is used, and if water comes in below, it is run-off or seepage (Tr. 39).

Melroy Graham, a witness for the defendants, testified

that he lives at Milburn. The Peterson ranch joins the Oldroyd ranch on the north. He has charge of the Oldroyd
ranch (Tr. 48). He gets part of his water from the North
Sanpitch Creek and part of it from South Sanpitch Creek
and has stock in Milburn Irrigation Company, getting water
out of South Sanpitch Creek. The North Fork has a flush
of early water in the spring and then it gradually gets less
and less along in July and August, it is practically dried up,
and the South Fork goes down to a small stream in the
summer (Tr. 49-50). He has seen Mr. Draper six times in
that vicinity in the last two years (Tr. 51). He takes the
Oldroyd water out of the North Sanpitch Creek and also
out of the South Sanpitch Creek. From the North to the
South Sanpitch Creek it 1.8 miles. Lone Pine Creek is 1.4
miles from South Sanpitch. Crooked Creek is one mile
south of Lone Pine Creek. Dry Creek is 1.6 miles from
Crooked Creek. Oak Creek is 1.9 miles from Dry Creek,
and there are other creeks going on down south (Tr. 53).
Oak Creek is the largest and the next largest is South Sanpitch Creek. North Sanpitch Creek flows about one second
foot in July and August in an ordinary year and it goes
down until some yeaTs it won't reach us. The stream west
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of our place on the west side of the valley is called Sanpitch
River and we do not take any water ~ut of it (Tr. 54).
Before 1949, I don't remember anyone coming up here for
the purpose of measuring water. North and South Sanpitch
Creeks head up in the mountains from a seep or very small
spring, gradually getting larger as it comes west (Tr. 55).
No one else takes water out of North Sanpitch Creek except us, Tanner and Mr. Peterson (Tr. 56). He had never
heard of the North Fork called the Sanpitch River until the
last two years, nor the South Fork (Tr. 59). South Sanpitch Creek is dry every year, as is North Sanpirtch Creek
(Tr. 63).
Henry V. Wheeler, who had property in Milburn in the
vicinity of Oldroyd · and Peterson, and who had been ac. quainted there all of his life, testified that he was president
of Milburn Irr~gation Company, getting water out of South
Sanpitch Creek (Tr. 69) .
Exhibirt "C" was admitted, being a deed by which the
company received its water right in 1915 from the "waters
of South Sanpitch Creek, flowing from what is known as
South Fork of Sanpitch" (Tr. 71-72). The witness' property was irrigated from the South Sanpitch Creek (Tr. 72).
He had never known that the North Fork was considered
the Sanpitch River (Tr. 74-75). His company does not take
any water directly out of Sanpitch River. He had never
seen the water commissioner around measuring water for
his company, although he had seen him up by Milburn (Tr.
75) . Sanpitch River is west, in the trough of the valley,
running south, and he had not known of any other place
or stream known as Sanpitch River except that. There is
no diversion for primary right below the Milburn liTigation
Coinpany; when the stream goes down to where is can be
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placed in the company canal, the company handles all the
water (Tr. 76). There are diversions below for high water
rights, but the company has never had any trouble about
high warter rights (Tr. 77).
Defendants' Exhibit ''A" was received to illustrate the
testimony (Tr. 82). This map shows them as "North Sanpitch Canyon" and "South Sanpitch Canyon". The witness
had not seen any map listing them as the North Fork of
the Sanpitch River and the South Fork of the Sanpitch
River, but had a map that shows the same position of the
creeks and li-sts them as the North Sanpitch Creek and the
South Sanpitch Creek (Tr. 83-84).
Charles E. Jennings, having property under the Milburn Irrigation Company, testified that he was water master for the Milburn Irrigation C'Ompany. He had never
seen Mr. Draper around there (Tr. 87-88). Draper, he was
informed, came to his house once and asked for him (Tr~
99). He disputed the amounts of water reported by Mr.
Draper on the basis of the witness' own observation. Defendants' Exhibit "E" was received, showing that Draper's
figures were based upon estimates and not measurements
(Tr. 105).
In rebuttal, the plaintiff recalled Frank Reese, wh~
testified that he attended the meetings of warter users on
Sanpitch River during 1950, 1951 and 1952. He said rthat
one of the gentlemen who was present, represented himself as chairman or a representative to the water users and
made the startement that more than fifty-one percent of the
water users were present. A committee called on the State
Engineer to have Blain Draper appointed Commissioner in
1950 and he refused, and they then considered Mr Cole, who
acted and in 1951 and 1952, the State Engineer appointed
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Mr. Draper as river commissioner for Sanpitch River {Tr.
107-108). The minutes of the 1950 meeting were received
as Exhibit No. 3 (Tr. 109).
Plaintiff's Exhibit 3 was admitted and shows that a
budget committee met with State Engineer and submitted a
budget; some of the items were questionable under a former ruling of the Supreme Court. See Utah Power & Light
Co. v. Richmond Irrigation Co., 115 Utah 352, 204 P.2d 818,
esp. 825-26).
On cross-examination Mr. Reese testified that there
were ten or fifteen users present at the meeting, and the
only evidence that the witness had was their representation that they stated they representeQ fifty-one percent of
the "Sanpitch River Distribution System" (Tr. 109). He
did not know that they represented fifty-one percent of the
water users of the Sanpitch River, including the tributaries.
''. . . .as a matter of fact, there was a question in my
mind as to whether the assessments then were wrong, because of the connection of the Sevier River system. It was
very confusing to me at that time."
. Minutes of the 1950 meeting were admitted as Exhibit
4. It was stipulated that copies of these minutes could be
placed in the records (Tr. 111).
When the evidence was closed, plaintiff moved to make
the amendment referring to the Sanpitch River System
rather than the Sanpitch River in his complaint, as stated
above, which amendment was made by interlineation, but
there was no further evidence offered, and the record is
silent as to any notice given to users on the system as a
whole, or any meetings or proceedings involving users on
any part of the system except Sanpitch River and the South
and North F1orks or Creeks.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

15
The attorney for plaintiff prepared findings, conclusions
and judgment, which were signed by the court on June 16th,
1952, and entered June 18th, 1952 (File 48-52). Within the
time provided by law, motion for a new tri·al was filed by
defendants and notice duly given (File 42, 46). The motion \Vas set down for hearing for September 30th, 1952,
and notice duly given to the attorneys for the respective
parties. At the hearing on the motion for new trial, which
plaintiff's counsel did not attend, the court, pursuant to
Utah Rules of Civil Precedure 59 (a), determined that the
findings, conclusions and judgment were erroneous and ordered the attorneys for the defendant to prepare new findings, conclusions and judgment, and in accordance with the
direction of the court, this was done, and copies were served
upon the attorney for plaintiff, together with a cost bill, on
or about the 13th day of October, 1952 (File 53-63).
On October 14th, 1952, the court signed the proposed
findings, conclusions and judgment, and on the 21st of October, 1952, copies of the findings, conclusions and judgment
as signed and entered were served upon the attorney for
the plaintiff (File 68) . On the 21st day of Ocrtober, 1952,
the attorneys for plaintiff filed and served upon the attorneys for the defendants the following objections:
"Comes now the plaintiff above named and objects to
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, submitted by the defendants herein, and particularly to Findings No. 4, No. 5, No. 6, No. 8, No. 10, No. 11, No. 13
and No. 14, on the grounds that they are contrary to
the evidence, and in violation of the statutes.
"[)ated this 20th day of October, 1952".
(Filed October 21st, 1952) .
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At the same time notice was given that the "plaintiff
will call up its objections to the proposed findings of fact,
and conclusions of law, on Monday, November 17th, 1952,
at 10 a. m., or as soon thereafter as plaintiff can be heard."
Later, the hearing on said objections was continued until
December 1st, 1952, at which time, after hearing arguments, the objections were by the court overruled and the
last findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment were
ordered to remain as the decision of the court.
'On the 31st day of December, 1952, the attorney for

the plaintiff filed in the office of the clerk of the District
Court purported notice of appeal in the following form:
(Title of Court and Oause)
''Comes now the plaintiff and appeals from the decision
of the judge of the above entitled court entered on the
1st day of December, 1952, and from the findings of
fact, ·conclusions of law and decree entered in the above
entitled matter
''Dated this 30th day of December, 1952.

js/ J. Lambert Gibson
Attorney for Plaintiff"
(File 69). Filed December 31st, 1952.
No designation of the record on appeal or statement
of points was filed until after the file had been forwarded
to the Supreme Court and until after the defendants moved
to dismiss the appeal on the grounds that it was not taken
in time. This was several months after the time provided
by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
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ARGUMENT

I.

The appeal should be dismissed.

Motion has been duly made. While upon oral presentation, this motion was denied, it is our understanding that
this does not preclude us from presenting the matter for
final adjudication in this brief. The matter is jurisdictional
and a review of the record in the light of prior decisions of
this Court will indicate, we believe, that if the appeal here
can be sustained, the Rules of Civil Procedure concerning
the mannar and time of taking appeals jurisdictional by
the express provisions of those rules and prior statute, will
hvae been disregarded. They should not be ·disregarded in
one case if they are to be applied in others.
URCP 73 (a) provides in the most positive language
that the time within which an appeal may be taken shall
be one month from the entry of the judgment appealed from
unless a shorter time is provided by law, except upon a
showing of excusable neglect based on a failure of a party
to learn of the entry of the judgment, the District Court in
any action may extend the time for appeal not exceeding
one month from the expiration of the original time herein
prescribed. The judgment in this case was entered on October 14th~ 1952. The purported notice of appeal was filed
December 30th, 1952. There was no showing of excusable
neglect before the District Court based on a failure of a
party to learn of the entry of the judgment, or for any other
reason. As a matter of fact, the record shows that not only
were the proposed findings, conclusions and judgment
served upon plaintiff's attorney, but within one week from
their signing by the judge, additional copies showing the
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signature on the final papers were served. No application
was made at any time to the District Court.
The same rule provides that the running of the time
for appeal is terminated by a timely motion made pursuant
to any of the following rules hereinafter enwnerated, and
the full time for appeal fixed in this subdivision commences
to run and is to be computed from the entry of any of the
following orders made upon a timely motion under such
rules: Granting or denying a motion for judgment under
Rule 50(b) to amend or make additional findings of fact,
whether or not an alteration of the judgment would be required if the motion is granted; or granting or denying a
motion under Rule 59 to alter or amend the judgment; or
denying a motion for a new trial under Rule 59. No such
motion was ever filed, claimed or acted upon. The only
paper filed was the objection to findings and conclusions
which moved the court to do nothing, was directed only to
proposed findings and conclusions and which were in no
way changed in form or substance after plaintiff was served
with eopies of the signed findings, eonclusions and judgment. After he was so served, there remained twenty-three
days for an appeal to be rtaken. There even remained three
days for the filing of a motion for a new trial or the other
motions specified in the rule. Nothing further was filed.
This Court recently dismissed an appeal because it was not
filed strictly within the one month. Brennan v. Lynch, 254
P.2d 454,
Utah
. In that case, the appellant
was only one day late. In the ·case at bar, he was more than
a month late. . This Court has properly pointed out that
notice of the judgment or ruling is not required to set the
time running. In re: Bundy's Estate, 241 P.2d 462. In
the case at bar, notice was actually given.
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To say that the objection to proposed findings is a motion for new trial or similar motion, in spite of subsequent
actual notice of the entry of judgment, and the ·fact that by
no stretch of the imagination could such objection be
thought to ·be one of the motions so specifically designated
in the rule, seems to say that a mere intent will substitute
for one of such motions or timely notice of appeal. It is to
say more, for there is nothing in the objection which resembles a motion or which indicates an intent to file any
such motion or to do anything else but note objections to
proposed findings and conclusions, which intent was made
completely moot and ineffective to the knowledge of plaintiff by receipt of copy of the findings, ·conclusions and judgment as signed by the trial court.
A reference to Rule 7, URCP, will show that by very
definition the objection could not be considered a motion:
"-An application to the court for an order shall be by

motion which, unless made during a hearing or trial,
shall be made in writing, shall state with particularity
the grounds therefor, and shall set forth the relief or
order sought. The requirement of writing is fulfilled
if the motion is stated in a written notice of the hearing
of the motion.''
This matter is jurisdictional, and jurisdiction must appear as we understand it. It should not be sufficient to say
that a motion might have been intended or would have ·been
filed under other circumstances or might have been acted
upon without any filing or even any making or presentation to the court, which the record utterly fails to disclose.
The form of the notice of ·appeal itself, which is also
jurisdictional, should be fatal to the appeal. The court to
which the appeal is taken is not stated in the notice. Rule
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73 (b) specifically provides that "The notice of appeal shall
. . . . designate that the appeal is taken to the Supreme Court.'' Plaintiff's notice of appeal does not do this
in form, substance or at all. The filing of the notice of appeal required by the rule is mandatory. If it is now to be
said that this rule does not mean what it says by mandatory language concerning the contents of a notice, the filing
of which is jurisdictional, then any paper, whether it complied with the rule in any respect, could be deemed a notice
of appeal.
No motion was filed to extend the time; the appeal was
not taken in time; the notice of appeal did not contain the
substance of what is required by the mandatory language
of the rule; the designation of the record was not filed in
time; no statement of points was filed as provided by the
rule. It would seem that if in any case an appeal should
be dismissed, this would be it. We submit that it should
be. There is nothing in the rules, or in our history or practice before, that would exempt the State from the requirements applicable to citizens on these points.

n.

Assignments or points sought to be raised by appellant are not based on the r.ecord, involve a misinterpJ~e
tation of it, and establish no basis for reversing the judgment of the lower court.

Assignment No. 1. This assignment is divided into
two parts: the first portion of the assignment follows
verbatim:
"That the trial court erred in finding that the respondents were not water users diverting water from the Sanpitch River System."
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There is no specification as to which particular finding of the court in which the court so found. We will therefore examine the court's findings to determine if the court
so found. If the court so found, error will be admitted. If
the court did not make such finding, such assignment should
be disregarded.
The court made fourteen findings (File 55 to 58), and
we submit that in none of such findings did the court make
any finding in substance or effect as set out in assignment
of error No. 1; but on the contrary, in its finding No~ 12,
the court did find that the respondents are Water users diverting water from the Sanpitch River System, which said
finding reads as follows: ·
"12. The court further finds that the North Fork and
the South Fork of the Sanpitch River are tributaries
of said river, and are a part of the Sanpitch River System, as alleged in the Amended ~Complaint of the plaintiffs herein as are numerous other tributaries of the
Sanpitch River as disclosed by the evidence in this case,
but the evidence further shows that the water users
from said North and South Forks are the only water
users using water from the tributaries of Sanpitch
River that have been assessed for the salary and expenses of the water commissioner of Sanpirtch River System for the years 1950 and 1951,"
As to the latter part of Assignment No. 1, that said
assessment was unauthorized and void, this necessarily follows from the finding made.
Asignment No. 2. This assignment is in two parts;
the first part reads verbatim as follows:
''The trial court erred in finding that the water commissioner never attempted to measure or distribute any of
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the water of the Sanpitch River, including the North and
south Forks thereof."
Appellant's brief does not specify where such alleged
finding may be found, or in whi~ch of the court's findings
such assigned error may be found. We submit, however,
that no such finding as error No. 2, either in substance or
effeot, can be found in the court's findings. The only finding where even the language of the said assignment may in
part be found is finding No. 10, which is here set out verbatim:
That the State Engineer during the years 1950
and 1951, made assessments against the water users
of the Sanpitch River, and included the water users
from the North Fork and the South Fork of Sanpitch
River, so called in the Cox Decree, for the alleged proportionate share of the money necessary to pay the
salary and expenses of the water commissioner of Sanpitch River, and including the water users of the two
tributaries of Sanpitch River ealled North and South·
Forks, but said State Engineer did not include or attempt to include the water users of the other tributaries of Sanpitch River, and said water commissioner
·at different times visited, and at times claimed to estimate the water being diverted from these forks by the
defendants herein, but he never attempted to measure
of distribute any of said waters."
u10.

There is nothing in such finding that could even remotely be held to find that the commissioner did not measure any of the water of Sanpitch River.
In the last portions of assignments of error Nos. 1 and

2, where the court is alleged to find and ·conclude that the
assessment made by the State Engineer was unauthorized
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and void, it should be noted that this holding applied only
to the- respondents herein, the great bulk of the assessments
being on Sanpitch River proper and therefore regular.
The only finding of the court wherein it is found that
the assesments made by the State Engineer were fotmd to
be unauthorized and void is finding No. 14, and that finding specifically mentions the assessments against the respondents, which is here set out verbatim:
"14. The court further finds that any assessment
levied or attempted to be levied by the plaintiff against
the defendants herein, L. L. Peterson, Mrs. R .. M. Oldroyd and/or the Milburn Irrigation Company, for the
years 1950 and 1951 as water users of the Sanpitch
River System and as claimed by plaintiff's amended
complaint was, and is, unauthorized and therefore
void."

m.

The court did not err in its Findings of Fact; and
its Conclusions of Law and Judgment are fully supported
by the Findings of Fact.
In the first point in appellant's brief, it is argued "That

the trial court erred in finding that the respondents are
not water users diverting from the Sanpitch River System
. . . ." Under his point II, it is stated "That the trial
court erred in finding that the water commissioner never
atempted to measure or distribute any of the water of the
Sanpitch River, including the North and South Forks thereof . . . ." We find it impossible to present our argument under headings corresponding to such assignments
for, as we have already pointed out in Division II of this
brief, no such findings were made. No findings other than
these supposed findings are attacked.
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We do submit, however, that the court's determinative
jactual findings are supported by the great preponderance
of the evidence and on most phases by the tmdisputed evidence. The court found in finding No. 10 that the State
Engineer during the years 1950 and 1951 made assessments
against the water users of the Sanpitch River, and included
the water users from the North Fork and the South Fork
of Sanpitch River, so called in the Cox Decree, for the alleged proportionate share of the money necessary to pay the
salary and expenses of the water commissioner of Sanpitch
River, and including the water users of the two tributaries
of Sanpitch River ~called the North and South Forks, but
said State Engineer did not include or attempt to include
the water users of other tributaries of Sanpitch River, and
said water eommissioner at different times visited, and at
times claimed to estimate the water being diverted from
these forks by the defendants therein, but he never attempted to measure or distribute any of said water. There is
no dispute in the record in support of this finding.
It seems apparent from the evidence introduced on behalf of the plaintiff and in that connection assuming that
the water commissioner of Sanpitch River went up to the
various diversions on the North and South Forks and looked
at them, then estimated the amount of water therein and
entered these amounts in his book as testified to by him,
without distributing or attempting to distribute any of such
water between the water users and without any necessity
in the least, could clearly be of no benefit to such water users, or to anyone else, except as a means, perhaps of easing
the assessment burden upon the water users of the Sanpitch
River below, and even if it should be further assumed that
these tributaries were actually a part of the Sanpitch River
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proper, even then there would be no service rendered to
the water users on such tributaries, or even to the water
users of the Sanpitch River, excepting as they might :be
benefited to the extent of the tribute imposed upon the de-·
fendants herein, which assumptions, however, are clearly
contrary to the basic classification in the Cox Decree and
contrary to the common acceptance over many years by
all interested parties without at least including the other
tributaries in the same positions.
By his amendment at the close of the evidence heapparently abandoned his contention that the North and South
Forks, or Creeks, were a part of Sanpitch River proper, and
relied upon their being part of the Sanpitch River System.
This the court found, but since there was no evidence either
offered or received that the assessment had been levied for
the Sanpitch River System at meetings called thereof, nor
even that Mr. Draper or his predecessor was commissioner
for the Sanpitch River System, and it affirmatively appearing that no proper assessment against the users under the
Sanpitch River System as a whole had ever been made or
attempted, it was properly concluded that the assessments
against the defendants were unauthorized and void.
The cases cited by plaintiff in principle support this
conclusion, as they recognize that arbitrary assessments
are contrary to law.
The first case cited by plaintiff is Bacon, State Engineer v. Gunnison Fayette Canal Company, 284 Pac. 1004,
75 Utah 278 decided January 30th 1930. The ~controversy
in this case arose from the method employed by the State
Engineer in apportioning the costs of distribution among
the water users of the Sevier River System (not including
Sanpitch River) . Previous to the year in question, such
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costs had been assessed against the users of water pro-rata,
according to the quantity of water distributed to the users
respectively, and as the assessments were to be paid in advance, the State Engineer's schedule of distribution for one
year was the basis of the apportionment for the next.
Such method had caused objections,. so in 1926 the
State Engineer introduced a new basis for apportionment
whereby the amount to be assessed and collected from the
users was made according to the amount of land upon which
the users were entitled to use the water for irrigation. The
new method proposed was shown by the evidence to be unequal as to benefits received and services rendered in the
case of the defendant, as it owned largely secondary rights,
which were ample for a short period during the high water
and then decreased so that later crops could not be served
and as a consequence, only crops that could be grown by
early irrigation eould be produced.
This case set a pattern which has been largely followed
in later similar cases. Theretofore by statute, it was provided that the costs of maintenance of ditches and canals
owned jointly by different parties were required to be paid
in accordance with the rights of such parties in the ditches
or canals, and where the State Engineer was called upon
by water users to distribute water to which they are entitled
as provided by statute, such users were required to pay
their respe·ctive portions of the costs.
The court in deciding the case above mentioned, determined that some similar method could well be satisfactorily employed by prescribing that the salary and expenses
of the water commissioner should be borne pro-rata by the
users of water from such river system. As the court concluded, the method employed by the State Engineer did not
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meet that requirement. The judgment of the lower court
was reversed and costs were awarded against the respondent, State Engineer.
The next case cited by appellant is Bacon, State Engineer, v. Plain City Irrigation Co. (another river system
case) 52 P.2d 427, 87 Utah 564, decided November 27th,
1935. This case reaffirmed the principle of the decision of
the Gunnison Fayette Canal Company case and on account
of the engineer failing to comply with that standard in the
attempted apportionment. Judgment was reversed, with
costs against the State Engineer.
The other case cited by the appellant in his brief is
Utah Power and Light Co. v. Richmond Irrigation Company, et al, decided April 8th, 1949, 204 P.2d 818, 115 Utah
352. This case also approves the formula or method laid
down in the two previous cases, to the effect t hat a standard should be employed in apportioning the salary and expenses of the State Engineer and making distribution of
water between water users in any water system or water
source. It is indicated that under the statute providing for
apportionment of the costs of the water commissioners for
distribution of water from any river system or water source,
required that expenses shall be borne pro-rata by wate·r
users based on their individual rights, although mathematical accuracy is impossible, apportionment ought to be
according to some standard which aproximates an apportion made according to services rendered .and benefits received. (In this case, the two cases hereinabove cited were
analyzed and approved with respect to the formula above
mentioned), and in the course of the opini·on, the Court said:
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tlon Company. Sec. 100-5-1, U.C.A., 1943, hereinbe-fore quoted, provides that the commissioner shall be
appointed when in the judgment of the state engineer
or the judge of tJhe district court it is necessary for the
purpose of distributing the waters from any river,
stream, or water source. This statute suggests two
elements: first, that distribution of the water between
users is necessary; and ~cond, that the persons or coinpanies chargeable with costs and expenses of the comnrlssioner obtain their water from the same water system or common water sQurce. To these two elemenis
should be added the requirement suggested in our
previous opinions, namely, that the assessment levied
should bear some reasonable relationship to the services performed or the benefits conferred. The record
shows an absence of all of these elements in the case
of Wellsville North Field Irrigation Company.
"There appears to be no necessity for a ·commissioner
to distribute the waters obtained from the springs located on the property of the Wellsville North Field Irrigation ·Company. The water used by this irrigation
company rises from two springs and all of the flow of
one spring and one-half the flow of the other is distributed through a system of canals exclusively under
its maintenance and control. The flow frQill the springs
does not equal the company's de·creed right and all of
the water belonging to the company is used by its members or stockholders. While some of the water reaches
the Little Bear River after it passes from the land irrigated by the company, there is no reasonable possibility of a commissioner performing servic.es in connection with the distribution of the escaping waters. Neither is there any reasonable nec~ty for a commissioner to divide the waters of ODte spring as this is done
by a permanent cement dividing headgate. (Emphasis
ours.)
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"Moreover, we are not convinced that the Wellsville
North Field Irrigation Company should be considered
as a user of water from the Little Bear River system
or from a source common with the other users. We do
not believe the Legislature intended to make the words
'water source' so inclusive that every person using surface water, percolating water, spring water or artesian
water should all be charged with the ~costs and expenses of a commissioner because some part of their flow
could be traced to a common source. We believe that
the words were used in their generally accepted meaning and that 'source' was intended to be restricted to
one origin such as a stream, a rise from the ground, a
fountain, a spring, an artesian basis or some similar
body; and that it was not the intention of the Legislature to combine a river system with springs and artesian basins for purposes of distribution and administration. We conceive many situations where such a
combination would bring about impracticable and impossible results.
''To require this company to bear a portion of the expense of maintaing a river commissioner who does not
render service to it and who in no way assists in distributing its water to any user would not be in keeping with the purposes or the statute or the previous decisions of this court.''
Justice Wolfe, concurring, said the following:
''I concur in the part of the opinion dealing with the
Wellsville North Field Irrigation ~Company on the other
ground names, to-wit: that no services are performed
for this company hy the commissioner, and the included
reason that there can be no relationship between services performed for, or benefits received by, the user
and the costs of distribution because no services are
rendered nor benefits conferred."
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That while these three cases are essentially river system cases and are distinguishable from this case now before. the Court, they support the position that whatever the
water commissioner of Sanpitch River, Blain Draper, d~d
as testified to by him as to visiting the said two tributaries
of Sanpitch River in 1950 and 1951, did not meet any standard as to service and benefits, that could authorize any
assessments levied upon the respondents herein by the State
Engineer. Such visits as respect service to such water use
was a ridiculous pretense and brazen attempt to impose an
unauthorized assessment upon the respondents.
Aside from that, these tributaries are not a part of
Sanpitch River, and have never through the years been considered as such, and the attempt to interpret the Cox Decree to mean that Sanpitch River proper, as distinguished
from the tributaries, heads up in the top of the Wasatch
Range at the head water of two canyons approximately two
miles apart and about seven miles long, is wholly Wlreasonable, and the court most properly found against any such
theory.
Finally, it would be the very essence of inequality and
capriciousness to say that these ·two tributaries out of a
large number of others in the same situation could be
singled out to help bear the cost of maintaining a water
commissioner upon the Sanpitch River.
IV. The court did not err in assessing costs against the
State Engineer.

It is urged by plaintiff under its point III that the court
erred in assesing ~costs against the State Engineer.
We can find no statute exempting the State Engineer
from costs in such actions as this. Utah Code Annotated,
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1953, 73-3-14, provides that "The State Engineer must be
joined as a defendant in all suits to review his decision, but
no judgment for costs or expenses of the litigation shall be
rendered against him . . . .'' This provision can have
no application to the present case, which is not one in which
the State Engineer is a nominal party, but is one where he
is seeking in his own right as State Engineer a money judgment against a defendant.
The plaintiff cites the last part of Rule 54 (d) to the
effect that costs against the State of Utah, its officers and
agencies, shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by
law. Costs against the State Engineer in an appeal to the
District Court under 73-3-13 is not permitted by law. We·
subrriit that they are authorized in such ·cases as the one
now before this Court. We think the first part of Rule
54(d) applies, that "Except when express provision th~
for is made either in a statute of this state or in these rules,
costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party
tmless the court otherwise directs . . . .'' As a matter of fact, in two of. the cases cited by plaintiff in his brief
in connection with other points, costs were awarded against
the State Engineer.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff's appeal should be dismissed for plaintiff's failure to file notice of appeal within time, and for other
reasons specified in this brief. This is not such a case that
would justify bending and breaking well established rules
governing jurisdictional requirements on appeal, if indeed
any case . is such a one·. The points upon which appellants
r~ly do not furnish any sound basis for claiming that the
judgment of the trial court spould not be permitted to stand.
.

I
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Not only is there competent evidence in the record to support the findings, conclusions and judgment, but the evidence greatly preponderates in favor of the defendants'
position. It affirmatively appears that the North and South
Forks or Creeks from which defendants obtain their water
are classified by the Cox Decree and by common acceptance for many years as tributaries, as distinguished from,
Sanpitch River; that the River Commissioner was appointro
and authorized to act only with respect to Sanpitch River
prope~; that to single out two tributaries out of a large nwn·
ber of others of the same nature to apply assessments
against was unauthorized and arbitrary, and that the purported services of the commissioner on the North and South
Forks were not such as to justify the assessments; that the
commissioner was never appointed or intended to be ap..
pointed for the Sanpitch River System, including the tributaries, and even if he were, to make assessments against
two trihutarie~ out of perhaps fifty in like position, cannot
be sustained. The trial court was correct in declaring such
assessments against the defendants void.
The importance of defendants' case, extending beyond
the relatively small amount of money at present involved,
has justified, we have been led to believe, the somewhat extended treatment we have. endeavored to give it in this
brief, and we trust will merit the favorable consideration of
the Supreme Court.
Respectfully submitted,
A. H. CHRISTENSON
A. SHERMAN CHRISTENSON
for CHRISTENSON & CHRISTENSON,
Attorneys for Defendants and
Respondents
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